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Immanuel Kant’s theory of justifiable resistance to authority is complex and, at times, appears 
to conflict with his own practice, if not with itself. He distinguishes between the role of authority in 
“public” and “private” contexts. In private—e.g., when a person is under contract to do a specific 
job or accepts a social contract with one’s government—resistance is forbidden; external behavior 
must be governed by policy or law. In contexts involving the public use of reason, on the other 
hand—e.g., when a person is faced with a moral decision or is engaged in a philosophical 
dispute—the freedom of conscience sometimes requires resistance, especially in cases where other 
persons inappropriately attempt to usurp authority over matters that are rightfully up to the 
individual to decide. In texts such as Perpetual Peace, Kant looks forward to a political situation 
wherein no political resistance (e.g., in the form of war) would be necessary. Yet in Metaphysics of 
Morals, he argues that a citizen never has the right to revolt against one’s government, suggesting 
we must cooperate even with war. On a personal level, Kant openly praised both the American and 
the French revolutions; yet when his own writings on religion were deemed by the censor to have 
come into conflict with the king’s edict, Kant failed to resist the (arguably unjust) authority; 
instead, he gave up his (apparently public) right to free philosophical expression, promising never 
to write or speak on religion again during the king’s reign. I shall argue that a key to resolving these 
tensions lies in the principle that universities must promote a healthy, public “conflict” between 
philosophers and all “private” employments of reason. The only ground for disallowing private 
resistance, therefore, is the underlying presence of genuine philosophical resistance. 
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I. The problem of conflicting values in authority-based contexts 
Immanuel Kant’s theory of justifiable resistance to authority is complex and appears at times 
to conflict with his own practice, if not also with the theory itself. In texts such as “The Doctrine of 
Right” (Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals), he argues that citizens never have the right to revolt 
against their government, suggesting we must cooperate even with war or situations involving 
politically-motivated abuse.1 Similarly, individuals in various types of contractual relationship, 
such as that between an employer and an employee, are duty-bound to cooperate with whatever 
policies or laws those in authority over them may impose.2 In other texts, such as Perpetual Peace, 
where Kant envisions a future world situation that will leave no room for political resistance of 
state against state (i.e., no room for war), he argues that this ultimate goal of human history can be 
reached only if states first agree to form themselves into a Federation of States, for this world body 
can then serve as a higher authority whose international laws each state would be obligated to obey, 
just as individuals within any given state must obey its internal laws.3 By means of theories such 
as these, Kant weaves into the very fabric of civil society a seemingly absolute requirement of 
obedience to whatever person or body may hold a position of authority over us. Many 
commentators have pointed out that this highly conservative message to individuals seems 
incongruent with the fact that Kant is widely regarded as one of the founding fathers of political 
liberalism. The main thrust of Kant’s political theory seems clearly designed to enshrine freedom 
and individual liberty as necessary requirements of an enlightened political community, so why 
does he repeatedly emphasize obedience to authority? 
Turning our attention to Kant’s personal views, we find a similar tension. Kant openly praised 
both the American and the French revolutions.4 Yet in 1794, when his own writings on religion 
were deemed to be inconsistent with the king’s edict imposing religious censorship, Kant failed to 
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resist the (arguably unjust) authority; instead, he gave up his presumed right to free philosophical 
expression, promising never to write or speak on religion again during the king’s reign.5 Kant has 
often been accused of lacking courage by responding to the censorship issue by simply caving in to 
the unjust pressure. It is worth noting here at the outset that his personal response in this case is 
actually consistent with his official theory, that we are to obey those in authority over us, even 
when we feel as if we are being abused. The tension remains, however, between his seemingly 
wimpish response to being censored and his seemingly wholehearted endorsement of revolutions 
around the world. In relation to both his private views and his official theories on the issue of 
resisting authority, commentators have therefore tended to be perplexed when attempting to 
explain how the sage of Königsberg could have held such divergent positions. 
In what follows I shall argue that we can resolve these tensions by coming to a proper 
understanding of three important perspectival distinctions. (A perspectival distinction is a 
description of two or more opposing ways of viewing one and the same subject matter, such that 
true statements can be made from each opposing viewpoint, even though the statements seem 
contradictory if considered in the abstract.6) The first key distinction is between the “private” and 
“public” spheres of rational discourse. As we shall see, Kant’s call to absolute obedience relates 
only to actions that occur in the private sphere. The second distinction is between the higher and 
lower faculties of the university. And the third is between assessing one’s own moral obligations to 
those in authority and appreciating reason’s influence on the historical development of the human 
race. I shall argue that for Kant the role of universities in general, and of the lower faculty (i.e., of 
philosophers) in particular, is crucial to a proper understanding of both his official theory (that 
disobedience to authority in the private sphere is never justified) and his personal expressions of 
support for various actual revolutionary movements (on the grounds that they are an inevitable 
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expression of public reason at certain crucial turning-points in human history).  
 
II. Two perspectival distinctions: Private vs. public spheres and higher vs. lower faculties 
In his short essay, entitled “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” (and in 
several other publications), Kant crucially distinguishes between the way authority functions in the 
“public” (öffentlich) and “private” (privat) contexts. His distinction tends to be somewhat 
confusing because in certain respects he uses these terms in a way that is opposite to the typical use 
of their contemporary English equivalents. We are acting in the private sphere in any situation 
where we are under contract to do a specific job or have entered (at least implicitly) into a social 
contract with our government. As I mentioned at the outset, Kant famously and controversially 
argues that resistance is forbidden in such contexts; external behavior must be governed by law (in 
the case of citizen-state relations) or policy (in the case of employer-employee relations), inasmuch 
as these are private agreements that can always be terminated by the individual, if the requirements 
imposed by the authority become too harsh to bear. Among the few absolute requirements that 
Kant’s theory of statecraft requires of all just governments is that slavery is forbidden and that 
citizens must always be free to emigrate.7 The reason Kant is so insistent on these points, whereas 
he is not so insistent that, for example, a democratic system is necessarily better for the people than 
a monarchical system, is that individuals must be free to terminate their relationship with the 
country of their citizenship, just as employees must be free to quit their jobs. 
We are acting in the public sphere, by contrast, whenever we are faced with a moral decision 
or are engaged in an open, philosophical discussion of issues relevant to ourselves or to all citizens 
of our state. In these contexts, Kant claims, the freedom of conscience sometimes requires 
resistance, especially in cases where other persons attempt to usurp authority over matters that are 
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rightfully moral and are therefore up to the individual to decide. Despite the common caricature of 
Kant as an extreme individualist, his moral philosophy is actually community-oriented to a large 
extent, depending as it does on the principle of universal values; this is why he regards a situation 
that poses a moral challenge as a matter of “public” concern, even though in a sense moral 
decisions relate to each individual’s “inner” rationality and are in that sense personal matters. 
Ideally, we work out the details of our moral obligations through free and open dialogue with 
others who are part of our social network of relationships. Kant is well known for regarding lying 
as one of the primary examples of an immoral act.8 So it should come as no surprise when he 
argues that our ethical (public) obligation trumps our political (private) obligation in the case of 
lying: presumably even if one’s employer or government were to order a lie, we would be justified 
to resist.9 
This first perspectival distinction suggests two basic conditions for the possibility of justified 
resistance to authority, although Kant himself does not spell them out very explicitly. First, if one’s 
government or one’s employer does not permit its citizens or employees to terminate their 
contracts, then this would seem to be a sufficiently irrational situation to justify a person in 
resisting the authority’s policies or laws. Citizenship, like employment, is a private choice, and on 
this assumption alone does it make sense to demand that those who accept the terms of the contract 
must obey the policies imposed on them by the recognized authorities. Second, a government (and, 
arguably, an employer) that leaves no room for philosophical debate also provides the citizen (or 
employee) with a justified rationale for resistance—though in this case it seems likely that Kant 
would say the only legitimate form of resistance is to terminate the contract (i.e., to emigrate or to 
quit one’s job). 
Kant discusses the second perspectival distinction in several publications, culminating in his 
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late work, The Conflict of the Faculties. In this book, Kant comments on the significance of the 
fourfold division in the structure of the Prussian universities of his day. The three “higher” 
faculties (theology, law, and medicine) were charged with the task of educating professionals who 
would have a direct influence on the welfare of the general public. Priests and their churches are to 
care for the spiritual welfare of the citizens in any state; lawyers and law enforcement agencies are 
to care for the welfare of people’s property; and doctors and hospitals are to care for people’s 
physical welfare. In each case, these professionals are under contract, ultimately with the 
government, to follow pre-established guidelines to insure that they treat the people properly. As 
such, governments (and so also, specific employers) have not only the right but the obligation to 
set up standards and to require that the members of each profession obey these standards. As Kant 
points out in What Is Enlightenment?, there would be a subtle irony in a situation where these 
professionals were never under any circumstances allowed to question the status quo. The irony is 
that ordinary citizens look to such professionals to establish the guidelines for good practice, but if 
they are duty-bound to obey those guidelines, then how will the guidelines ever improve as 
knowledge develops? 
Kant’s key to resolving the problem of how the higher faculties can both obey the rules as 
they now stand, and yet also question them in an effort to promote healthy change, lies in the role 
of the lower faculty, the faculty of philosophy. The task of philosophers in the university is not 
merely to debate amongst themselves, but also to engage in a healthy “conflict” with members of 
the higher faculties. Philosophers’ debates with theologians, lawyers, and doctors constitute a 
public employment of reason, even though the matters they are debating relate to the private 
sphere that, as such, commands absolute obedience. In other words, Kant’s ultimate rationale for 
never allowing private individuals to resist the status quo is his assumption that an undercurrent of 
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genuine philosophical resistance is present in the public sphere. As Kant again puts it in “What Is 
Enlightenment?” (largely a tribute to the enlightened policies of King Friedrich Wilhelm I): 
But I hear from all sides the cry: Do not argue! The officer says: Do not argue but drill! The tax 
official: Do not argue but pay! The clergyman: Do not argue but believe! (Only one ruler in the 
world says: Argue as much as you will and about whatever you will, but obey!)10 
When the private use of reason is at issue, arguing with the rules is simply inappropriate: the duty 
of the good citizen is to obey. But such a stance is tolerable only in a context where the authorities 
do not regard public argument as threatening to their authority. Kant’s position, in other words, is 
that society in general ought to imitate the healthy conflict that should be exemplified by the 
university structure, wherein students can at one and the same time be trained (from within their 
own faculties) to be responsible, law-abiding members of professions such as lawyer, doctors, and 
priests, and yet also (when undertaking concurrent philosophical studies) systematically question 
the very policies and procedures they are learning to trust. A political system that can insure peace 
and stability, and thereby minimize the risk of being toppled by revolutionary forces from within, 
must seek to imitate this balance between public freedom of expression and private compliance 
with the law. 
 The key distinction provided by What Is Enlightenment? is between the use of coercion, 
which is based on the state (civil coercion being possible only in virtue of the state’s existence), 
and the use of persuasion, which is a distinctively human power and therefore can be done only by 
those who have preserved their own humanity. A state cannot allow individuals to use violent 
resistance, because to do so would be to contradict its own sovereignty. A revolution that succeeds 
is in this sense taking a step backwards, reverting from the civil state to the state of nature. 
Resistance at this level is therefore justifiable, on Kantian grounds, only if its purpose is not to 
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overthrow the state but to communicate with it, with the state’s ultimate improvement as the goal. 
Several commentators have argued that, provided one’s resistance to authority takes the form 
not of active subversion, but of what we would nowadays call civil disobedience (at least in the 
passive form of refusing to obey), then it serves as an essentially communicative act and as such is 
justified and not subject to the charge of being subversive of authority. One who disobeys in a civil 
manner (i.e., non-violently) is not attempting to cheat the system or set oneself up as an authority 
that is somehow above the law (this being the core of Kant’s objection to individuals deciding 
unilaterally to break the law), but is attempting to communicate to those who make the policy that 
the purposes of justice are not being served as adequately as they could be, so that certain aspects 
of the existing policy or existing law need to be reformulated. Understood in this way, civil 
disobedience, especially when performed by groups rather than by individuals, can be regarded as 
a public rather than a private act; as such, it does not necessarily contravene Kant’s principle that in 
the private sphere one must always obey. 
  
III. The third perspectival distinction: Individual morality vs. the role of reason in history 
The foregoing two perspectival distinctions, between the private and public spheres of 
rational discourse and between the higher and lower university faculties, enable us to grasp the 
limits of Kant’s apparently absolute insistence on obedience to authority. It turns out that Kant is 
not rejecting any and all forms of disobedience; instead, his point is that, viewed from the political 
perspective alone, it would be self-contradictory to formulate a law or policy giving citizens the 
right (within the private sphere) to disobey. Rights, and the laws or policies on which they are 
based, function as tools of coercion. If I disobey a traffic law, for example, the existence of the law 
gives a policeman or the courts the right to employ coercive force against me. A right to disobey 
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would empower an individual to apply a similar degree of coercive force against a policeman or a 
judge, simply because I do not like the law. Kant rejects this justification for resisting authority 
because it would undermine the entire basis for civil society.11 Rather than appealing to coercive 
force (a tool of the private sphere), justified resistance must transcend private political agreements 
by appealing to public reason. In other words, any acceptable form of civil disobedience must be 
an essentially communicative act, whose main purpose is not to force the authorities to change but 
to influence public opinion; if one’s government is good, then such acts will eventually lead to the 
desired change of policy.12 The goal of all such public discourse, according to Kant, is to learn to 
“think in the position of everyone else”;13 when a person is not in a position to form an actual 
group that is powerful enough to influence the sovereign, this mindset can still be used as the key 
to determining when an individual person is justified in resisting authority. The problem here is 
that the general public, even (or perhaps, especially) in a democracy, is often influenced by 
non-moral incentives not to think from the unprejudiced position of the common good; ordinary, 
unenlightened people often have in mind only the rewards they stand to gain from the particular 
faction they support, and in this way the unforced force of public reason tends to be ignored. 
This deeper understanding of Kant’s position only highlights the strangeness of the fact that 
Kant himself openly declared his support for actual revolutions of his day, such as those in the 
USA and France. In order to understand how this could be more than just blatantly inconsistent or 
disingenuous, we must call attention to a third perspectival distinction, between an individual’s 
moral self-understanding and the historical evolution of the human race. 
In those passages where Kant admits that an individual has a right to resist authority, he bases 
this on what he calls an “internal juridical duty”, stemming from the “right of humanity in our own 
person”;14 this is closely related to what Kant calls “duties to oneself”. Kant holds that these take 
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precedence over our external duty to obey the sovereign power.15 This is because to disobey our 
duties to ourselves causes us to turn ourselves into a mere thing, and we lose all dignity, essentially 
sacrificing the humanity in ourselves. Kant states at one point that we must avoid any situation that 
involves “debasing humanity in one’s person (homo noumenon), to which the human being (homo 
phenomenon) was nevertheless entrusted for preservation”.16 Kant’s point is that human beings 
should view their political rights as an opportunity to preserve humanity and its moral duties. 
Morality is what is being preserved here, not the state. As Kant writes near the end of Metaphysics 
of Morals: “Be no man’s lackey. – Do not let others tread with impunity on your rights”.17 Thus, 
he earlier makes an explicit allowance for at least a passive form of what we would call civil 
disobedience: “Obey the government (in everything which does not conflict with inner morality 
that has authority over you)”.18 In an article discussing these issues Sven Arntzen interprets these 
passages to mean that “the exercise of political authority must, for its own preservation, observe 
the limits expressed by the principle of humanity…. Political authority requires for its own 
preservation that the subject resist under the relevant circumstances.”19 But this interpretation 
misunderstands the referent of Kant’s distinction between the noumenal (moral) and phenomenal 
(political) perspectives on this issue. Civil disobedience is justified only if its purpose is to 
preserve the (moral) goodness of the political authority, not to preserve the existence of a political 
system per se. From that perspective, as we have seen, resistance will always appear to be 
self-contradictory. In other words, the political perspective on its own gives us no justification for 
resistance to its authority.  
A proper understanding of Kant’s meaning is crucial, because the phenomenal side of this 
third perspectival distinction, that will enable us to understand the self-consistency of Kant’s views 
on justified resistance, is that what is true for the individual’s moral obligations in the present 
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situation is not necessarily the same as what is true for the overall evolution of the human race. 
According to Kant, reason itself develops, and we may therefore look forward to human history 
eventually reaching an inevitable goal, as described most fully in Perpetual Peace. The rational 
(though perhaps unreachable) goal of the human race is to build a society where people are good 
enough so that fewer and fewer (and ideally, no) external laws will be needed in order to coerce us 
to be good. The categorical imperative insures that being good means cooperating with other 
rational beings (including animals and even nature, insofar as these can be conceived as in some 
sense rational agents). Laws are needed only insofar as people are not cooperative. So, not 
cooperating with a so-called “bad law”, or even with a “bad regime”, displays a disposition that 
will ironically cause the political situation to become worse—i.e., to be supplemented with more 
and more fine-tuned laws that will restrict the people’s freedom (by forcing them to cooperate) still 
further.  
The only exception is the situation where one is so overwhelmed by the moral evil one is 
being asked to perform that those in power will clearly recognize your act of passively refusing to 
obey as posing a challenge to the status quo. In the cases of both the American and French 
revolutions, the motivation was not merely a lack of justice for an individual or for a small interest 
group, but outrageous moral acts that raised the level of concern from one of ordinary treason to 
one of promoting humanity’s historically-significant moral evolution. As noted above, Kant 
accepts the distinction introduced by Hobbes and others, between the “state of nature” (where 
brute force and the will of the most powerful determine what is right) and the “civil state” (where 
people enter into a contractual agreement with governing authorities). The reason he officially 
rejects the legitimacy of revolution is that a revolution inevitably requires, at least temporarily, the 
destruction of a civil state and a return to the state of nature. By contrast, gradual reform from 
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within is always preferable. Revolution can be justified, it seems, only if all other avenues of 
change have been attempted without success, and if the public use of reason by the people 
confirms that the status quo has become too immoral to tolerate. 
We are now in a position to suggest two reasons that Kant could have given to clarify why he 
approved of the American and French revolutions, as cases of justified resistance to the 
government authority. First, he was not a citizen of those countries, so he was also not subject to 
their social contract. In this very pragmatic sense, he would not have found himself duty-bound to 
obey or affirm the principles of their regimes. In other words, unlike citizens of the British colonies 
that became the USA or of pre-revolutionary France, Kant the citizen of Prussia was in a position 
where he could observe events in these other countries in a more objective matter. While he would 
have been obligated to obey the authorities in those countries, had he been a citizen, his distance 
enabled him to assess the events from the perspective of their historical implications. Therefore, 
even though individuals involved in these events acted immorally when viewed from a purely 
political perspective, the basic moral values they enshrined can be appreciated as empirical 
evidence confirming Kant’s belief in the inevitable progress of human history toward more 
rational (i.e., moral) social structures. 
A second rationale that Kant might have cited is that the British and French regimes were not 
allowing their people to terminate their collective contract with their government. If he perceived 
the British and French governments as putting their subjects into a situation of virtual collective 
slavery, then Kant’s admiration for the ideals of these revolutions is not as inconsistent as it 
initially seems. His statements regarding the illegitimacy of revolt all refer to the internal 
consistency of the law or constitution: the sovereign cannot build into the law of the land a right to 
overthrow the government, for this would undermine the force of the law itself and create a 
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paradoxical situation whereby the sovereign is not sovereign. This, Kant thinks, would be a recipe 
for disaster. It makes no sense for a government to have a law, or for a company to have a policy, 
that states “if you disagree with the rules, you do not need to follow them.” Instead, Kant’s position 
is that enlightened governments will encourage their citizens to debate the rules in public as much 
as they wish, provided they obey the rules in their private relations until such a time as the rules 
may change as a result of public debate. This is not inconsistent with the view that in 
some—hopefully rare—cases, the only recourse an enlightened public has is to revolt. There is no 
necessary inconsistency in rejecting revolution in general as a legitimate political strategy, because 
it lacks civility and requires a return to the brutality of the state of nature, thus involving its 
perpetrators in morally questionable actions, but at the same time admitting that from the 
perspective of the long term historical development of humanity, revolt may be the only way 
forward when a highly oppressive regime refuses to heed public reason. 
  
IV. Conclusion: Summary of the Kantian conditions for justified resistance to authority 
 Having defended the consistency of Kant’s position on the necessity of obedience to proper 
authorities with his admiration for successful democratic revolutions, I shall now conclude by 
summarizing the basic Kantian conditions for the possibility of justified resistance to authority. 
First and foremost, we have seen that resistance in the form of public, philosophical debate is itself 
a fundamental condition for the possibility of an enlightened government. In much the same way 
that resistance functions in the physical world as a constructive expression of the balance between 
the opposing forces of attraction and repulsion,20 every political authority needs resistance in 
some form. In a healthy, enlightened society (or a company or any other structured organization), 
resistance occurs through the agency of rational public debate, for which philosophers ought to be 
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the exemplars. Properly functioning philosophy departments in properly functioning universities 
are crucial to Kant’s vision of the enlightened state. In the context of such enlightened societies, 
citizens are always obligated to obey the law, even if they disagree with it—the sole exception 
being those rare cases when obeying a law would require a person to act immorally. No citizen in 
such a society would ever be justified in staging a revolution, because it will always be more 
productive, from the standpoint of human history, to change the system from within. The highest 
degree of legitimate resistance in such contexts would be a passive form of civil disobedience, 
which must always remain peaceful in order to be called “civil”. 
In a society that does not enjoy the freedom of expression that makes all of this possible, 
resistance of other types may be needed. In such contexts, for example, it is far more likely that a 
person might be required to do something he or she regards as immoral. Kant’s position is that 
subjects in such a society should still obey the law even when they disagree with it (just as Kant 
himself assented to the king’s censor when he was accused of having expressed views on religion 
that were deemed subversive of the government’s approved doctrines). This is because obedience 
is good, and making moral goodness real in human society is the rational goal of human history. 
But in extreme circumstances, when even civil disobedience (i.e., passive non-compliance) on the 
part of large portions of the population fails to persuade the sovereign authority to change its ways, 
the ultimate expression of resistance, revolution, may be the only option that will honor our human 
duty to preserve the humanity that ought to be reflected in every political system. In cases where 
the sovereign wrongly attempts to squash all resistance, revolution is justified by the broadest 








                                                 
1 6:320-323. Even if the constitution of one’s state is clearly defective, “it is still absolutely 
unpermitted and punishable to resist it” (6:372). For enlightenment comes not through revolution 
but gradual reform (8:36 [“What Is Enlightenment?”]; cf. 6:355). See also Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View, where he associates revolution with “barbarism” (7:326). Interestingly, 
in Perpetual Peace he admits that “violent revolution” may be the only way a republican 
constitution can occur in a democracy (8:353; cf. 8:372). References to Kant’s writings cite the 
volume and page numbers of the Berlin Academy edition. 
2 For “it is an external duty to keep a promise made in a contract” (6:220), even if the other party 
has no power of coercion to force me to comply (6:219). Kant thus devotes a whole section of the 
Doctrine of Right to “Contract Right” (6:271-276). As applied to states: even though a revolution 
may in a sense be justified “by a bad constitution” (8:372-373), “during the revolution anyone who 
took part in it by violence or intrigue would be subject with right to the punishment of rebels.” Cf. 
6:353. 
3 In the “Second Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace”, Kant calls this body a “league of nations” 
(8:353-357). Kant makes similar suggestions in Metaphysics of Morals (e.g., 6:349) and elsewhere, 
as in Idea for a Universal History (8:28) and On the Common Saying (8:311). 
4 See e.g., Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
pp.4,155,340-343,375-378, 400,405. 
5 For Kant’s own account of this event, see his Preface to The Conflict of the Faculties (7:5-10). 
6 For a thoroughgoing examination of this principle and its relation to Kant’s philosophical system, 
see Chapter II of my book, Kant’s System of Perspectives: An architectonic interpretation of the 
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Critical philosophy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993). 
7 Kant carefully distinguishes between slavery and the practice of employing domestic servants, 
which is allowed (6:282-284); the only exception is that the state can treat certain kinds of 
criminals as if they were slaves (6:333). On the right of emigration, see 6:338. 
8 The duty never to make a “lying promise” is the standard examples Kant uses to illustrate one of 
the four basic types of duty (perfect duties to others) in both Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals (4:402-403,419) and Critique of Practical Reason (5:21,61). 
9 This, I take it, is one of the key points made in Kant’s infamous 1797 essay, On a Supposed Right 
to Lie from Philanthropy (8:425-430), though his choice of examples makes Kant easy prey for 
those who think he is justifying a cold disregard for the welfare of others. Kant makes the duty to 
disobey explicit in Religion (6:100n; cf. 6:154n), where he argues that “when human beings 
command something that is evil in itself (directly opposed to the ethical law), we may not, and 
ought not, obey them.” 
10 8:36-37. 
11 As Sven Arntzen points out (“Kant on Duty to Oneself and Resistance to Political Authority”, 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 34.3 [July 1996]:409-424, quoting p.410), commentators 
agree that Kant’s main point is to argue that “there can be no positive law according to which a 
subject has a right of resistance.” 
12 For an excellent account of how Kant’s position leads to just such a view of civil disobedience, 
see the concluding chapter of Redar K. Maliks, Making the Center Hold: Kant on Sovereignty and 
Resistance (Columbia University PhD dissertation, 2008). See also Kant’s On the Common Saying, 
8:304. 
13 This is the second of three “maxims of the common human understanding” that Kant lists in 
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Critique of Judgment (5:294). It is closely related to the first of the three characteristics of “the 
freedom to think” that Kant defends in his essay What Is Orientation in Thinking? (8:144): “how 
much and how correctly would we think if we did not think as it were in community with others to 
whom we communicate our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us!” 
14 6:236 (Metaphysics of Morals). 
15 In Lectures on Ethics (Collins), Kant says: “the duties that stem from right and benevolence are 
not so binding as those towards myself” (27:433). 
16 6:423. Arntzen (op cit., p.414-419) rightly emphasizes the importance of this passage but 
misunderstands the preservation as being about the juridical state, not the moral state. 
17 6:436 (Metaphysics of Morals). 
18 6:371 (Metaphysics of Morals). 
19 Arntzen, op cit., p.424. 
20 Cf. Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science; e.g., 4:527,552-553. 
